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Introduction 
This paper concerns the operationalization of the concept of Gross 
National Happiness (GNH). It assumes that GNH is a uniquely Bhutanese 
approach to development. GNH may have applications beyond Bhutan, but 
that is central neither to its definition nor to its operationalization. The 
paper further assumes that GNH is a strategy for social and economic 
change in Bhutan and, therefore, must be operationalized in policy decisions 
and actions. To argue this, it places the concept of GNH in the context of 
Bhutanese history and of the general history of the concept of development.  
The Bhutanese State 
Introduction 
As we shall argue, the Bhutanese State is and must be the “subject,” the 
primary actor in the program of change that we call GNH. However, the 
State itself, we argue, is a relatively new development in Bhutanese history. 
This chapter will briefly explore its history and development. 
For our purposes, the state, in the abstract, may be defined in broad 
theoretical terms, as follows: 
First, the State is the monopolist of legitimate coercion in a society; 
Second, the State is the primary font of legitimacy in the society; Third, the 
State is the primary source of leadership in social, economic, and security 
affairs, i.e., in those affairs that, broadly speaking, affect the interests of the 
people who inhabit a domain defined, at least until now, by legal 
boundaries that, in turn, define the reach of the State’s power. Several points 
need to be made with regard to this description of the “State,” because they 
will be significant in analyzing the history of the emergence of the 
Bhutanese State: 
First, the State is not the same thing as the “Nation,” and, indeed, bears 
no relationship to it whatsoever. The concept of the “nation-state,” which 
emerged in 19th century Europe, presumes the existence of an entity called 
“the nation,” defined as a particular “people” who share certain common 
characteristics beyond the fact that they inhabit a specified territory 
(however that territory itself may be defined). It also presumed that there 
should be some isomorphism between the State and the Nation, and in 
romantic terms this led to the idea that the State was somehow a natural 
expression of the will of the Nation. Of course, in fact there were many 
states that contained more than one “nation,” so that “ethnic conflict,” as we 
would call it today, and the domination of one ethnic group over others, 
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became common. The State, however, existed long before the appearance of 
the concept of “nation” in its modern sense.   
Second, the State has a history of its own, independent of the nation or 
people over whom it may rule. Similarly, a nation or people may have a 
history of its own independent of the state that rules over it. 
Third, the history of the State concerns the establishment of its primacy 
over other elements in society. For example, the State, over time, gathers 
coercive power to itself and suppresses rival sources of coercive power in 
the territory over which it claims jurisdiction (whether legally or purely by 
the exercise of power). It also concerns the processes whereby it 
incorporates into itself, or at least into its power penumbra, the right to 
grant legitimacy in its territory. Finally, the history of the State concerns the 
process whereby it assumes the leadership role, sole or primary, in its 
territory. As we shall see, in Bhutan as elsewhere the State does indeed 
possess a history, and we will argue that prior to 1907 no Bhutanese state 
existed in these terms. 
The Bhutanese Polity before the Advent of the Zhabdrung 
The history of the Bhutanese polity may be said to begin with the 
arrival of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal in Bhutan from Tibet in 1616. 
Until that time the geographical expression that became Bhutan lacked any 
figure of non-religious importance whose influence or power was more than 
local, and it possessed no institutions of governance that extended beyond 
local valley clans and their chiefs. At various times one or another family or 
religious institution extended its sway over regions near its place of origin, 
but none of them were able to provide anything approaching an integrating 
political system. 
The Zhabdrung’s Government 
Whatever political structures may have existed in Bhutan before the 
arrival of the Zhabdrung in the 17th century, there can be no question but 
that he created a political structure (but, of course, a political structure is not 
the same thing as a State). It is also obvious that in his person what modern 
social science would distinguish as the political and the religious domains 
were intensely intricate with each other if they were not completely 
isomorphic. In other words, the Zhabdrung does not appear to have 
distinguished the political from the religious. This is particularly clear from 
his construction of dzongs, in which the religious and the political domains 
essentially occupied, and continue to occupy, the same physical space. 
From what we understand of the Zhabdrung’s administration and 
laws, Buddhism, particularly the Drukpa Kagyu school, provided the 
ideological basis for his conquest of Bhutan and for the institutions he 
established in the country. His conquest was based, apparently, on his 






and he consistently expanded his conquests of one or another part of the 
country with the aim of establishing the Drukpa Kagyu school’s legitimacy 
in more and more territory. In doing so, he contended with both “religious” 
and “secular” (to the extent this distinction can be made for that period) foci 
of power in one geographical region after another. On the one hand, this 
may be understood as an extension into Bhutan of what had become at that 
time the standard form of the polity (unlike the West, for example, where 
even in the era called “medieval” there was a distinction and conflict 
between the religious power [the “church”] and the secular power [the 
“Holy Roman Empire”]). What is significant for our argument is the 
tradition the Zhabdrung’s polity established in Bhutan, that is, the 
intrication of Buddhism and politics, and this continues to be the case to the 
present time. 
Upon his retirement from active leadership, the Zhabdrung established 
a regime that may be called a “diarchy,” to borrow a term. Essentially, the 
role of leadership and administration was divided into two. The position of 
Desi was established for political or public affairs, and the Je Khenpo was 
given responsibility for religious affairs. It is not clear, however, that this 
was any more than a convenient administrative arrangement. Perhaps it 
was the Zhabdrung’s intention to prevent the return to political power of 
non-Drukpa Kagyu Buddhism in Bhutan by inhibiting the concentration of 
power in the hands of monastic groups by separating the two kinds of 
leadership. 
In any event, it appears that during the years after the Zhabdrung’s 
retirement and death, real power lay with the religious sector rather than 
with the “public”. In fact, many of the Desis were themselves members of 
religious groups or had spent time as members of monastic communities. 
If the Zhabdrung had indeed intended to establish a stable diarchic 
political structure in Bhutan that rested upon some kind of institutional 
coherence, by the time of the 5th Desi power had become highly 
decentralized at best, and the country had lost its institutional coherence. 
The coherence that had originally derived from the personality of the 
Zhabdrung now dissolved into a congeries of warring “feudal” potentates 
(the term “feudal” is used here more evocatively than, perhaps, accurately) 
whose power was very often defined geographically and depended on, first, 
their ability to raise and maintain militia-like military forces and, second, on 
their political ability to make, and break, alliances with other feudatories. To 
the extent that any central administrative polity existed at all, it existed only 
in a very formalistic way. The Desi himself became only one among the 
many actors in the political game, though the position was prized because it 
seemed to lend an aura of legitimacy to its holder.  
By the middle of the 19th century, as the struggle for power among the 
regional magnates increased, the Desis lost their political role or, at least, the 
reality of any political role that had been assigned to them in the 
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Zhabdrung’s scheme of governance. By mid-century, the possession of 
power for its own sake seems to have become the primary reason for the 
possession of power. One local magnate, the Trongsa Penlop, began to 
emerge as the most powerful among the warring feudatories, but this did 
not imply the existence of a state, only the particular military and political 
competence of the Trongsa Penlop of the time. The possession of the 
position of Desi did not convey to its occupant any particular primacy in the 
decentralized polity.  
The crucial event at the beginning of the process of constructing a new 
Bhutanese polity was the Duar War of 1864-1865. A cursory glance over the 
historical record suggests that up to the Duar War, central power and 
leadership had all but disappeared from the country, and the War itself was, 
in a certain way, a consequence of the disappearance of any real, or even 
theoretical, central power. At the same time the Duar War served the 
assertion of power by Jigme Namgyal, the Trongsa Penlop. The Duars were 
an important economic resource for the development and maintenance of 
Jigme Namgyal’s power, and their loss inhibited, or at least denied him, 
access to resources necessary to continue his drive to power at that time. In 
1870, he retired from his position as Trongsa Penlop and became the Desi.  
In addition to his military and political abilities, Jigme Namgyal 
evidently possessed a personality and personal attributes that attracted 
power whether or not he held a formal title or position. He was, we may 
argue, the first real political personality to emerge in Bhutanese history 
since the Zhabdrung. However, despite this, his own very self-conscious 
attempt to build a regime of people of demonstrated loyalty did not survive 
his retirement from the position of Desi after the customary three years in 
office. In other words, as strong a personality as he was, the institutional 
framework for a polity that could extend itself into the future did not yet 
exist, a consequence, perhaps, of a combination of Bhutan’s geographical 
features, its level of technological development, and the importance of 
personality. Personality is not institutionalization. Power itself was the prize 
in the political struggle, and power was prized not as a means to an end but 
as an end in itself. This is the framework within which the eventual creation 
of the monarchy in 1907 must be understood, along with the significance of 
that development. 
Centralization of power, rather than its institutionalization, 
characterized Bhutanese political life between the Duar War and 1907. It is 
probably the case that the Trongsa Penlop, Ugyen Wangchuck, possessed 
decisive, if not ultimate, power in Bhutan after the Battle of Changlimithang 
in 1885. The question must be asked: Why did he continue to maintain the 
traditional institutions of a headless polity instead of establishing a 
centralized monarchy? This can be explained, perhaps, by a certain 
ambiguity at that point in time. Very briefly: Ugyen Wangchuck begins to 






within Bhutan while, on the other hand, he goes through a process of 
experimental interaction with what was then, as it is now, the 
overwhelmingly dominant power in the region, India. 
Between 1885 and 1907, there would appear to be a disjuncture 
between Ugyen Wangchuck’s own understanding of his position in Bhutan 
and the British understanding of his position in Bhutan. Although he was 
the dominant figure in Bhutan, the British treated him much as they treated 
other “native rulers” of India. For example, he was invited to attend the 
durbar held on the occasion of the visit of the Prince of Wales to India, an 
occasion that was clearly intended by the British to constitute the 
ceremonial recognition by the Indian “native” rulers of the paramountcy of 
the King-Emperor of India, of the British Raj. The British clearly intended to 
incorporate subordinate rulers into the hierarchical system of the British 
imperial polity, and Ugyen Wangchuck, doubtless unwittingly, participated 
in this drama. He was awarded a knighthood with the title Knight 
Commander of the Indian Empire, a common British practice of 
incorporation of subordinates. And he continued to play this role of a 
subordinate of the British when, for example, he participates in the 
Younghusband expedition into Tibet in 1904.  
The continuation of the old non-centered political structure in Bhutan 
after 1885 id not reflect the reality of the new consolidation of power in 
Ugyen Wangchuck’s hands, just as his symbolic incorporation into the 
British scheme of things did not reflect the reality of his power.  
The creation of the monarchy in 1907 is a reference back to the polity of 
the Zhabdrung but in a radically new context. The new institutional 
framework of power rested upon a consensus between Ugyen Wangchuck, 
the Monk Body and the other, now diminished, power holders at the 
meeting in Punakha in December1907. Bhutan now possessed the symbol 
and the reality of the institution of monarchy that reflected the growing 
concentration of power within the country. The new monarchy had as its 
rationale the establishment of peace and security throughout the country. 
The Creation of the Monarchical State in 1907 
The ambiguity that characterized power in Bhutan between 1885 and 
1907 was not immediately resolved by the creation of the Monarchy. In fact, 
the Treaty of Punakha of January 8, 1910, which defined the relationship 
between the Monarchy and British India, suggested an ambiguous power 
structure that obtains to the present day and whose resolution is still being 
sought. Bhutan had complete internal sovereignty, according to the treaty, 
but it undertook to consult with the Raj about its foreign relations. This was 
diplomatic recognition of Bhutan but with less than full sovereignty. The 
provision was a reflection of an objective reality that obtains to this very 
day, the overwhelming preponderance of India in the region, regardless of 
who the ruler of India may be. The treaty provision defined a problem with 
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which Bhutan is still wrestling. The fact that the provision applied to 
Bhutan’s relations with other entities that were within the power penumbra 
of the Raj or that, in later times, lay outside of it but beyond Bhutan’s 
borders, continued the ambiguity suggested in the British approach to 
Ugyen Wangchuck before 1907 and reinforced afterwards by his attendance 
at the Delhi Durbar of 1911. 
The years from 1907 to 1998 were a period of consolidation and 
development of the instruments of power. The support of the Monk Body 
and the surrender or acquiescence of the other power centers in Bhutan to 
the primacy of Ugyen Wangchuck did not provide a popular base for the 
monarchy. This he now proceeded to create by a series of measures that 
would establish a basis for support of the monarchy. Peace, of course, which 
only the monarchy could provide, was central. But he took particular 
measures to engage the people’s support: the reduction of land taxes and 
customary service; the encouragement of trade and commerce within the 
country; the improvement of transportation and internal communications. 
He also, and very significantly, initiated modern education, although on a 
very limited scale. At the same time, he promoted the improvement of the 
Monk Body and of its institutions and education, a very reasonable and 
significant policy that paralleled his approach to the encouragement of 
popular support for the new polity.  
The Second King, Jigme Wangchuck, who came to the throne in 1926, 
ruled during an era of very interesting developments in the outside world. 
During a period of great social, economic, and political instability abroad, 
the stability of Bhutan and of the monarchy perhaps rested on the 
disjuncture between Bhutan and the outside world, on the 
underdevelopment, in Western terms, of the country. Because Bhutan did 
not yet have a monetarized economy, it was not drawn into the economic 
crisis that began in 1929. Because it was not politically integrated into South 
Asia, it was not drawn into the Second World War from 1939 to 1945. 
Because it had not been colonized, it was not drawn into the anti colonial 
movements that were so characteristic of the post-World War Two world. 
Because its relationship with the British Raj was characterized by what was, 
after all, a very creative ambiguity, Bhutan was not drawn into the 
reorganization of the subcontinent that accompanied the independence of 
India and Pakistan and the consequent absorption all the states of British 
India by the two new states. In other words, non-engagement (“isolation”) 
was an extraordinarily powerful instrument for the preservation of Bhutan's 
independence.  
Domestically, the Second King followed his father’s policy of 
consolidating power while pursuing several important new policies. The 
First King had established the centralized monarchy, but he had retained, to 
a large extent, the decentralized structure that was characteristic of the 






monarchy and the administration into coherence, and consequently he 
assumed absolute power, which meant the administration had to be 
centralized in the throne, not dispersed regionally. Local administrators, as 
they died or retired, were replaced by personnel appointed directly from the 
throne. The size of local administrations was reduced in order to restrict the 
ability of local administrators to act independently. Local power was further 
restricted by requiring a central audit of local taxes, incomes and 
expenditures. The development of a standing army, albeit at this point in 
time only in the form of a purely ceremonial unit, was started. Education 
within the kingdom and the dispatch of selected children to Kalimpong for 
schooling also increased, although on a still very limited basis. 
Transportation was upgraded, medical units were opened, and the repair of 
temples, monasteries, bridges, etc., was undertaken. In 1948, after Indian 
independence, Bhutan signed a treaty with India that, at least formally, 
regulated its relations with the country in more modern diplomatic terms 
than had been the case with the Raj.  
The Third King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, was educated with a 
significant difference from his predecessors. At the age of 15, he was sent 
abroad by his father to England, and upon his return he was carefully 
groomed for kingship. His trip abroad had probably made him more aware 
of the external world than had been the case with his father and 
grandfather. He pursued a more activist foreign policy than his 
predecessors. In fact, during the reign of the Third King foreign policy and 
domestic policy became more closely related than had ever been the case 
before. Bhutan joined the Colombo Plan in 1962, signaling an activist policy 
toward economic development. The kingdom joined various international 
organizations and in 1972 became a member of the United Nations. It 
established diplomatic missions abroad on a very limited basis. India 
became the primary support of economic development after a visit by its 
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1958. India became the major 
supporter of road construction, telecommunications, etc.  
Parallel to, and supported by, his foreign policy, the Third King 
introduced significant domestic changes. Land reform was introduced and 
land taxes were reduced. Serfdom was abolished. The Royal Bhutan army 
was established, as was a police force, both measures that increased the 
central power of the throne. Most significantly, the Third King introduced 
important institutional changes. In 1953 he established the National 
Assembly. This assembly reflected in its composition, as it continues to, the 
sociopolitical history of the country. First, the assembly was created by the 
king as a way of developing further support for the monarchy, not as a 
consequence of public demand. It was to be an instrument of education 
more than an instrument of legislation. In fact, until 1968 the legislative 
supremacy lay with the king, not the National Assembly. Of course, even 
after that date, when the king voluntarily gave up his authority to veto 
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legislation, the National Assembly still continued to be the instrument of the 
throne at least until 1998. The composition of the National Assembly 
includes "elected representatives", “representatives of the Monk Body", 
representatives nominated by the government, and a smattering of others. 
In 1963, the King established the Royal Advisory Council as an instrument 
for advising the King and the government. In effect, the Royal Advisory 
Council has served as a more direct instrument of the throne's will. It 
provides the King with independent information and points of view. Like 
the National Assembly, the Royal Advisory Council represents the variety 
of social groupings in the country. A law code was drawn up, capital 
punishment was abolished, and a separate court structure was established. 
All of these institutional changes rested upon the legislative and 
administrative centrality of the throne.  
These measures were instrumental in achieving the Monarchy’s 
objectives of sovereignty, security, stability, and modernization. The latter 
was most obviously symbolized by the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan 
in 1961. Successive five-year plans all aimed at infrastructural development 
and the development of human resources to support these objectives. With 
the Third Five-Year Plan, which started in 1971, a Planning Commission 
was established to manage the process, and the present king, then the crown 
prince, was named chairman. The Third King also initiated the development 
of Dzongkha as the written language, a work very much still in progress.  
The creation of the monarchy in 1907 was not the result of a popular 
movement, nor of the development of nationalism among intellectuals or 
the bourgeoisie such as had developed in the West. Furthermore, it was not 
the consequence of an anti-colonial movement as was the case in other 
"Third World” countries, such as most of the countries in South Asia, for 
example. The creation of the monarchy in 1907 was a consequence of 
protracted struggles for power in the absence of a centralized polity. 
Developments since 1907 may be interpreted as consequences of the 
dialectical interaction of the monarchy, on one hand, and, on the other, the 
outside world that was undergoing rapid and deep changes, Bhutan’s 
geography, and the necessities of power.  
Moreover, it must be emphasized, all these developments took place 
without a broad theoretical framework to underpin them or to guide choices 
and decisions or to set objectives beyond the instrumental values of 
stabilizing the country and defending it. The creation of a national 
community based upon a vision of the future and a search for the path to 
reach it was to be the work of the Fourth King. 
The Maturation of the Bhutanese State 
The signs that indicated the maturation of the Bhutanese state in terms 
that began to suggest the necessity and efficacy of a definition of values and 






domains became apparent with the accession to the throne of the Fourth 
King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, in 1972. It is interesting to note that in his 
coronation address in 1974 he said, "The most important task before us at 
present is to achieve economic self-reliance to ensure the continued progress 
of our country in the future." It is reasonable to suggest that in the context of 
the early 1970's, this goal, stated baldly and boldly, fit the circumstances 
both inside Bhutan and in the international context within which Bhutan 
had to develop at the time. Internally, the Fourth King pursued 
development in many directions in such a way that the social changes 
already under way, urbanization, for example, were accelerated, and at the 
same time he moved in new directions and pursued new policies of 
transformation. This is neither the time nor the place to attempt a close 
description of the remarkable transformation that Bhutan has undergone 
during His Majesty's reign. Much research needs to be done about this 
before anything more than a general picture can be outlined.  
However, certain trends can be clearly observed that define current 
concerns. First, it is undoubtedly true that the impetus for broadened and 
intensified development derived from the Throne itself; in other words, the 
activism that had characterized the Wangchuck dynasty and state since 1907 
became, and remains, the primary source of energy for change. This may be 
because Bhutanese society did not, in the immediate or in the more remote 
past, develop those social classes the conflict between which provided the 
dynamics for social change that characterized other societies. This, also, is a 
subject for research before anything definitive can be stated, but it is highly 
suggestive. A consequence of this seems to be the profound centrality of the 
throne in all matters of policy generation. It is interesting to note that at 
various points in the history of this reign attempts by His Majesty to transfer 
authority to other state organs in one way or another have been resisted; the 
most significant step in this regard, the Kasho of 1998, had all the 
appearance of insistence on the part of His Majesty, contrary to the wishes 
of the National Assembly and the people, that power be transferred from 
the Throne to a government in the interest of further development. This 
suggests that the intellectual or ideological conceptual foundation for the 
development of institutions in which the locus of political power, as 
opposed to moral power, would be located, had not permeated sufficiently 
deeply into the society. 
Second, the context of Bhutanese development has changed radically 
during this reign. In 1972, economic self-reliance was not an unreasonable 
goal. The demand side of consumerism had not developed to the point it 
was to reach later, certainly because communications technology had not 
yet developed or spread to the extent where they nourished a new 
consumerism. Furthermore, social change had not reached the point of 
providing a class basis for consumerism, and a sufficient economic surplus 
in any sector had yet to be generated to support consumer demand. The 
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increase in tourism, together with, more recently, growth in information 
technology, combined with economic development and social change, more 
importantly knowledge in certain groups of about the outside world, have 
resulted in the rapid increase of consumer demand for foreign goods. Given 
the size and resources of Bhutan, the growth of consumerism is a direct 
threat to the goal of economic self-reliance. 
The growth of the power of the institutions created at Bretton Woods in 
1947, together with the increased influence of neo-liberal ideology, the 
combination of which we call "globalization", have created forces that have 
an impact on Bhutan which it may not be able to control by the same 
policies that up to this time were efficacious for development. To put this as 
bluntly as possible: the various trends just mentioned have created social 
groups within the country that are the primary source of demand for goods 
and services that contradict and undermine the stated objectives of the 
Bhutanese state’s development policies. For example, self-reliance is 
undermined by the growth of consumerism, which can only be supported 
by the importation of foreign goods. This also undermines the attempt to 
create a national Bhutanese culture both as a value in itself and as a defense 
against homogenization with the rest of the world, which would undercut 
the very raison d'etre for Bhutan, which would, in other words, undercut 
the entire thrust of modern Bhutanese history in the Kingdom’s attempts to 
remain separate from the subcontinent's historical trends. This can also be 
clearly observed in the struggle to establish the primacy of the Dzongkha 
language. A national language is not just a cultural conceit, as His Majesty 
repeatedly points out. English is the agent of the cultural homogenization 
that is the servant of economic global integration, of Globalization. To the 
extent that English dominates over Dzongkha in the daily life of the 
Bhutanese state, the goal of cultural self-reliance and independence recedes 
into the background.  
At the same time, the intellectual weakness of Bhutan's position with 
regard to formulating a Bhutanese policy for development, rooted in 
national interest, has opened the process up to the dominating influences of 
theories and practices that reinforce the tendency to homogenization with 
the rest of the world. We must be very clear about this. Reliance on the 
private sector and on market forces is an historical artifact that is a 
consequence of political developments in the outside world rather than of 
any scientific or "natural " forces. In other words, the importance accorded 
to the private sector in terms of development is an ideological and political 
decision not necessarily dictated by theoretical or objective criteria or by 
national interests. Given the primacy of the modernizing Bhutanese state in 
the process of national development, the tendency to try to place greater 
reliance on the private sector and on market forces is contradictory. 






contradicts the ideological, emotional, and psychological foundations of the 
Bhutanese state and of Bhutan itself.  
It follows from all of this that the growth of these kinds of 
contradictions during the reign of the Fourth King requires some form of 
resolution, a resolution that will find its institutional and cultural expression 
in the formulation of educational, cultural, social, and economic policies that 
will be aimed at achieving the goals that the society and culture may 
implicitly desire.  
His Majesty’s promulgation of the idea of Gross National Happiness as 
a national policy pointed in the direction of seeking a resolution to the 
contradictions Bhutan faces. The challenge now facing the country is the 
operationalization of this idea, which means challenging, not accepting, the 
received wisdom of the West. It is precisely the general acceptance of the 
received wisdom of the West in these matters that undermines the National 
Project. What the country must now undertake is the definition of the 
national project. Reflection on this issue, supported by new research into all 
aspects of Bhutanese society, is the mark of the maturity of the Monarchy 
and the Kingdom. Gross National Happiness is at one and the same time 
reflection on theories of development, on policies of development, and on 
the values that should guide those policies. It is self-analysis and critical 
thinking in the definition of the nation’s future rather than simple 
acceptance of guidance from abroad.  
This is why GNH is so significant. It must now encompass both 
ideological programs and practical policies. GNH is a national necessity for 
the survival of the country within the context of the particular conjuncture 
of developments at this time in the world at large, developments that are 
fraught with all of the issues that constitute the core of the very existence of 
a nation. These developments we gather under terms like “globalization” 
and “WTO”. The rest of this paper will now address this constellation of 
requirements. 
GNH and Development 
In the decade since the fall of Communism, many thinkers and 
authorities have been attempting to define a “third way” between neo-
liberal free market Capitalism and now defunct Communism. The attraction 
of GNH outside of Bhutan lies in this search. In this section we will look at 
GNH in this perspective. 
GNH and Ideology 
The word “ideology” has come in for much opprobrium in recent 
decades, largely for two reasons: First, it was appropriated by one side in 
the struggle for dominance in the world, the Soviet side, to refer to what 
that side considered to be correct thinking and analysis; consequently, it 
was disparaged by the West and given a negative connotation. Second, the 
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negative connotation given to “ideology” was used to assert what the 
opponents of Communism argued was the scientific basis of their own 
thinking. Thus “ideology” was opposed to “science” and, therefore, to 
“truth,” as the latter term was used more and more to refer only to what 
science itself could demonstrate. Nonetheless, in order to understand GNH 
and to give it the multi-dimensional meaning it requires, the term 
“ideology” serves good purposes, at least for our present discussion. 
The concept of “ideology” was born from the French Revolution, 
which, in fact, gave birth to three separate, if not entirely distinct, 
“ideologies”. The concept is very closely related to another concept, 
“modernity” and to the processes of “modernization,” i.e., those processes 
that are intended to reach or create the condition of “modernity”. We will 
return to the question of “modernity” later. 
What is “ideology,” at least as we will use it? Ideology is, first and 
foremost, a political program. To be more precise, it is the constellation and 
construct of ideas that, taken together, define a political program. It is 
understood that the term “political program” means the plan and the 
objectives of the plan that are pursued by a state and government to achieve 
certain objectives. As a political program, ideology consists of the following 
elements: (a) It is an image or a description of what is going on in the 
society, in the political economy, at a particular time. It is not just a 
description of events and processes; it is an analysis of them, of their causes 
and effects. (b) Ideology gives an image or a description of what is going on 
that is prompted by, and exists in contrast to, what the past was, and an 
understanding, its own understanding, of how the past was ended by a 
particular event. For example, in Western history that event was the French 
Revolution. In Bhutanese history, that event was the foundation of the 
Monarchy in 1907. (c) Ideology provides an evaluation of the past as a point 
of departure for action in the present. Again, note the significance of 1907 in 
Bhutanese thought. (d) Ideology is one of the mechanisms by which people 
cope with change and modernity. Change, which in today’s dominant 
system of thought is called “modernization,” is always unsettling, always 
disturbing to people’s expectations and modes of behavior. Ideology makes 
it possible for people to cope with that problem either by explaining it 
positively or by providing a basis for resistance to it. (e) Ideology suggests 
specific actions and frameworks for action that make it possible to cope with 
the processes of change that are implied by the condition of the world after 
the event or events which end the past. Each of these five characteristics 
applies to the concept of GNH. 
Weltanschauung is another word that is useful in defining GNH in the 
context of contemporary Bhutanese society. Any given period of history can 
be defined as a combination of two factors. The first is the particular social 
and cultural reality that exists at any given period of time. For example, we 






occurred that we see marks a break in history. The creation of the monarchy 
in 1907 is such an event. The second factor is the Weltanschauung that 
accompanies the particular social reality. The word Weltanschauung means 
“world view” and is, to put it succinctly, the understanding that people who 
inhabit a particular social reality have of the way the world works. 
Obviously, a particular social reality and its Weltanschauung exist in a 
dialectical relationship. Changes in one lead to changes in the other, and the 
domain that dominates is social reality. The two may not change in tandem, 
i.e., there may be unevenness in change, so that, for example, the 
Weltanschauung of a particular period of history may last longer than the 
social reality that gave rise to it. In the view of modernity, this is what is 
often referred to as “backward thinking.” Weltanschauung differs from 
“ideology” in that it does not possess the characteristics discussed above, 
i.e., ideology is a mechanism for coping with change in the combination of 
social reality + Weltanschauung. None of this is to imply, incidentally, that 
change is, or is not, to be desired. This is merely a mechanism to describe a 
process, not to evaluate it. 
Three broadly defined ideologies emerged from the French Revolution. 
First, conservative ideology was a reaction against modernity. The objective 
of its political program was the reconquest of power in order to restrain the 
process of modernization. In its weakest form, conservatism sought to limit 
the damage of change and to hold back, or slow down, as long as possible, 
the changes that were coming. In its strongest form, it wanted to return to, 
to reestablish, the past. Conservatives understood very well that the state 
was the key instrument to achieve their goals. 
Second, liberal ideology, which defined itself as the opposite of 
conservatism, based itself on what it considered to be “the consciousness of 
being modern.” Liberalism claimed to be universalistic, which is to say that 
it claimed to apply to all human beings everywhere. Because of this, liberals 
believed, liberalism could be intruded into the logic of all social institutions 
and processes. It was the key to burying the past and giving birth to the 
future. While conservatives were concerned with the restoration of the 
particular past that they felt was disappearing, the liberals believed that the 
future they outlined applied to all mankind, regardless of any particular 
characteristics. Moreover, in order for history to follow its natural course -- a 
natural course that was confirmed by the scientific observation of change in 
nature, particularly by Darwinism -- the liberals insisted that it was 
necessary to promote conscious, intelligent, continual reformism in the full 
awareness and conviction that “time was the universal friend, which would 
inevitably bring greater happiness to greater numbers.” It should be very 
clear that contemporary neo-liberal economic and social theories belong in 
this category of ideology. Liberalism believed that progress was inevitable, 
but it could not be achieved without some human effort, without a broad 
political program. Moreover, the existing political institutions, created in the 
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break with the past, were necessary to achieve the political program of 
liberalism. It is apparent from Western experience and politics that 
liberalism is not clear about the relationship between particular political 
institutions and its political program. In any event, liberalism is a 
particularly Western position, as we can see from its claim to universal 
validity. 
The third ideology to emerge from the French Revolution and its 
aftermath was socialism. Socialism differed from Liberalism in that it was 
convinced that the achievement of progress required a very conscious 
helping hand, without which progress would be very slow. Liberalism and 
Socialism agreed that change and progress were part of the “natural order 
of things,” i.e., of history and nature, but while the Liberals were willing to 
“let nature take its course”, more or less, the Socialists believed that the 
application of reason could define the objectives of change and the means to 
achieve those objectives; moreover, history could be accelerated by this 
application of reason. Primary examples of socialism today are the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, etc. 
Whether they have “Socialist” governments or not, they fall under this 
ideological rubric. 
In summary, Conservatism sought to limit the dangers change posed 
and, if possible, to reverse the process; Liberalism sought to achieve human 
happiness through the application of Western logic and reason; Socialism 
agreed with liberalism but sought to achieve happiness through careful 
planning to reach specific goals. These distinctions are analytically 
important although there has been a great deal of overlap among the three 
ideological positions. GNH, in its potential ideological and pragmatic 
formulation, commands international appeal and interest because it is an 
alternative to the three positions outline here. 
The “subject” of Ideology and Change 
GNH is an ideology in the sense described above, which is to say that it 
is, or must become, a program of social and economic change and 
development. Consequently, it must concern itself with the question, “Who 
is the subject?” or, to put it another way, “Who is, or should be, the 
principal political actor in defining and carrying out the political program of 
GNH?” 
The existing ideologies, Conservative, Liberal, Socialist, have never 
been able to resolve this question. It was raised by the French Revolution 
because the revolution declared that the people, not the monarch, was 
sovereign. In other words, the French Revolution raised an issue that 
nobody has ever been able to resolve clearly: where does sovereignty 
reside? Each of the three ideologies discussed above has provided its own 
answer, however unclear. The Conservatives argue that traditional groups 






ought to be sovereign. These often include the family, the church, and even 
medieval guilds. The Liberals insist that the individual is the historic 
“subject” of modernity and that, therefore, the individual is sovereign. The 
Socialists argue that the whole people, taken as a group, as an entity, is 
sovereign. For them, the issue is: who is a member of “the people”? Quite 
obviously, these positions raise more questions than they can answer. 
Here are some of these questions. If all individuals are equal, does this 
mean that each individual has the same right to determine the future of 
society as any other individual? Is the future of society to be determined 
simply by counting numbers? Is it not the case that, with the spread of 
information technology and the unwillingness or inability of the society to 
control either the quality or the content of the information available, the 
very existence of faulty or even false information limits the ability of each 
individual to come to reasonable conclusions concerning policy and the 
future. If that is the case, is a simple counting of numbers (votes) a sufficient 
way to determine the good or the happiness of the whole? Does this not 
mean that control rests with those who do indeed command the nature and 
the dissemination of information?  
Moreover, is it not also the case that not all individuals can participate 
in determining the good or the happiness of the whole? For example, 
children, the insane, criminals, all are excluded in many societies from 
participation in the process. Where do we draw the line? To cite an 
important example: If Bhutan joins the WTO, it surrenders, by very 
definition, the right to determine who participates in defining and achieving 
the happiness of the Bhutanese whole to external forces, even individuals, 
who are not members of the Bhutanese community, who do not share its 
values, its history, and whose own definition of good or of happiness has 
developed without reference to Bhutan at all. In other words, Bhutan 
surrenders to market forces and to the powers that are dominant in the 
market its own sovereignty, its own right to determine what is its gross 
national happiness. It thereby limits the freedom of the Bhutanese state to 
function on behalf of the Bhutanese people. The “subject” of Bhutanese 
society, of Bhutan’s political program, not only ceases to be Bhutan but 
becomes an external, foreign, actor. 
Let us assume that Bhutan does not join the WTO and retains 
sovereignty for itself. This leads to another question: Where within 
Bhutanese society does sovereignty lie? Does it lie with His Majesty the 
King? Does it lie with “the people”? Does it lie with the government? This is 
not an easy question to answer, and we can find much evidence that points 
to this difficulty. For example, Bhutan is admired throughout the world for 
its environmental policies. It is considered very progressive and wise in 
pursuing these policies. But who decided to pursue those policies? Bhutan's 
environmental policies may inhibit happiness in quite different sectors of 
society. The private sector is inhibited in the pursuit of the happiness of 
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private entrepreneurs because Bhutan’s environmental policies place off 
limits the use of important natural resources for private achievement of 
happiness and, some would argue, for the improvement of the social whole. 
Second, they limit the happiness of all or many village communities, and of 
the individuals who live in them, because environmental policies place off 
limits the use of these resources for the pursuit of their economic well-being, 
i.e., their happiness. And yet, it may also be argued that these policies 
promote the welfare of all, even though certain individuals and sectors of 
society would not agree. This argument suggests that the "Actor", the 
primary subject of the political program of gross national happiness, may 
not be the people as a whole or even the sum of individuals. Indeed, the 
issue of the environment and its future has been determined on the basis of 
a set of values that are not defined democratically or by those who are most 
directly affected by the policies adopted. This problem is not unique to 
Bhutan. In many Western countries it is being argued and resolved in 
various ways on a daily basis. In actual practice, Bhutan has resolved it in a 
particular way even if it has not named that way: Bhutan has decided that 
somewhere in its polity is located the power of sovereignty, that is to say, 
the power to determine that, for example, the environmental policies 
Bhutan is pursuing are correct for the entire people even though the people 
did not choose these policies. Most people would agree that this is not 
unreasonable. 
Whatever may be their position with regard to the location of 
sovereignty, all ideologies, which is say all political programs, necessarily 
see the state as the primary instrument for carrying out the agreed-upon 
political program, however that program may have been agreed upon. That 
is the case with Bhutan’s environmental policies. 
Another issue that all three ideologies have in common is the 
relationship between the state and society. One of the major consequences of 
the French Revolution was the appearance of the concept of “society” as an 
entity separate from, and in opposition to, the State. This concept spread 
around the world, and in its most contemporary form, “civil society,” it is 
used in Bhutan too. Indeed, in Bhutan today there are studies of “civil 
society”, precisely as the concept was defined after the French Revolution, 
i.e., society as self-existing, outside of or in opposition to (not contrary to but 
different from), the State. For example, the State is understood to be 
“coercive” in one or another way, while “civil society” is assumed to be, 
somehow, volunteristic. Of course, this is too simple because it does not take 
into account the coercive elements in civil society, such as peer or 
community pressures to conform and perform. These were always present; 
indeed, they are at the core of “traditional society,” but they have only 
recently come to the attention of social theory as “civil society” emerges 
onto the analytical screen in contrast to the State. It is important for GNH 






The three ideological positions that have co-existed in the West since 
the French Revolution have been the subject of much debate, and in the 
1960s many began to argue that, after all, there was only one ideology of 
which these were simply three variations. That ideology was called 
“Liberalism,” and both Conservatism and Socialism were redefined as 
variations of it rather than as separate and distinct ideologies. In any case, 
what is important from our point of view of GNH is the questions these 
ideologies raise, most particularly the questions of the “subject” and of the 
relationship between the State and Society. 
GNH and Change 
The Age of Liberalism, in which change and development were first 
considered to be a good, began with the French Revolution in 1789 and 
lasted to the fall of Communism in 1989. This was the period in which in 
which the liberal idea that progress and change could be achieved in a 
measured and reasonable fashion by the application of science to the 
management of change dominated Western thought. The five-year plans, 
whether Bhutanese or Indian or Russian, exemplify this idea. This was the 
ideology of liberalism.  
Before the French Revolution, the Weltanschauung of almost all 
societies and the systems of empires and other political entities had 
assumed the normality of political, social, and economic stability. In a way, 
this is what was meant, afterwards, by “tradition”. In this world of stability, 
sovereignty was visibly present in the person of the ruler, and a whole set of 
equally stable customs and regulations controlled who had power to rule 
and under what conditions. Change was considered exceptional and had to 
be justified in exceptional terms.  
With the French Revolution, all of this changed and a new 
Weltanschauung developed, or began to develop, which by the time of the 
European revolutions of 1848 assumed the normality of change. Indeed, 
change itself, change in political systems, economic systems, and, of course, 
changes in technology and changes brought about by technology, became 
the norm. The assumption of change as normality became a point of 
departure even in politics: changing one's political rulers was both desirable 
and normal. The only difference between conservatives, liberals, and 
socialists concerned attitude toward change; conservatives were not happy 
about it and socialists wanted to make it happen more coherently, more 
directly, and faster. But nobody questioned change itself.  
Not only did people not question change; they did not reserve areas of 
life outside of change. Obviously, the tension between change and not-
change is very much at the root of contemporary fundamentalism and other 
similar movements. It is in this context that GNH becomes at one and the 
same time a critique of Western theory and an attempt to formulate a 
different approach to the issue of change. GNH offers a fourth possibility, 
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one that does not rest on the unquestioned assumption that change is, in 
and of itself, either good or inevitable. GNH needs to posit the following: In 
the West change is seen as “natural”, “unavoidable,” in itself, while GNH 
suggests that change needs to be seen in a moral and cultural perspective. In 
the West, all points of view accepted change, and the issue was the speed 
and the instrument of change. The function of specialists was to record 
change; they could not prevent it. As time went on and development 
became a program, specialists assumed a different role, as we will see. The 
Socialists claimed to create specialists in change, but in reality their concept 
of change was the same as that of the Liberals and Conservatives. GNH, in 
contrast, argues that change itself must be placed under analysis, and that 
the process needs to be guided by certain values and specialists in those 
values. At least, that should be what the GNH argues. 
One of the consequences of the French Revolution, one of the hallmarks 
of the "Modern", was the shift of the locus of theoretical sovereignty from 
the ruler to the people. This opened up the question of whether any 
particular state reflected, or was the embodiment of, the will of the people. 
In this nexus appears the primary schism in Western thought between state 
and society, a dichotomy that has dominated Western thought from the 
early 19th century down to perhaps 1989. 1989 is the date some people 
would use to mark the end of this dichotomy. In that year, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, symbolizing the fall of Communism, released the dominant 
classes in the West from the necessity of using the apparatus of the state to 
control change. Communism had posed a direct challenge to the West 
precisely in the field of change both theoretically and practically. Once 
Communism passed from the scene, the state was no longer an absolute 
necessity; it was really only necessary for control, but the state itself could 
now be dismantled and privatized for the benefit of those who controlled 
the means of production, which meant the managerial class. It was fortunate 
for that class that technology, particularly communications technology, had 
reached the point where it was relatively easy to control public attitudes 
and perceptions. The present situation, therefore, is a consequence of a 
fortuitous confluence of developments. The argument is being made today 
that, first, the state inhibits natural processes of change and development. 
The state is a danger to the natural freedom of the reified individual and of 
the natural power of the free market. Here we have to make it very clear 
that this is itself an ideological position, an historical artifact, and it does not 
carry either the force of science or of reason. Bhutan must deal with this 
question very seriously in GNH. In Bhutan, the transfer the locus of 
theoretical sovereignty from the ruler to the people has not yet taken place, 
if indeed it has even begun. Bhutan is therefore in a position to consider this 
matter carefully and pursue a course more suited to its own situation and 
needs. In Bhutan the issue or dilemma of state vs. society has not been part 






this dichotomy, so central to all Western social thought, has never really 
existed. GNH ideology needs to reflect on the implications of this and on its 
meaning and potentiality in the definition and process of development.  
In the Western Weltanschauung of modernity, the individual has 
become a reified being, which means two things: it means that the 
individual is assumed to exist in and of himself, and he is a thing in nature. 
Of course, this is contrary to both village society and culture and to 
Buddhist thought and practice. In the West, this reified individual, this 
thing in nature, is, by virtue of its natural existence, assumed to possess 
certain "inalienable rights " which neither the state nor society can 
contravene. This assumption lies at the heart of the Western suspicions of 
the state, which is considered inimical to these alienable rights; therefore, 
much of Western social, political and economic theory is concerned with 
protecting the rights of the individual. Since 1989, however, in the new 
“neo-liberal” world, the state is still seen as the enemy, but now the market 
has the right to transcend the rights of the individual. This is a serious and 
practical matter. The market does not need to account for the welfare of the 
individual. In fact, it is now assumed that the welfare of the individual will 
be taken care of by the market, and the market is protected by the theory 
from being called into question. The market is a transcendent natural force. 
In Bhutan, quite obviously, none of this pertains. GNH must critically 
examine these assumptions and provide its own set of assumptions based 
upon the experience of Bhutan, not the West. All this means that Bhutanese 
development is now taking place in a radically new context, in which the 
old liberal verities of the West have been canceled and replaced by new 
ones. Ironically, this effect allows Bhutan to pursue its own path.  
The development and supremacy of market forces in the 19th century 
West was a political program that was based to a large extent on the 
emergence of an entity called the “nation”. Originally, the concept of the 
nation emerges as a definition of a commercially viable market. In other 
words, a nation constituted that region and or people within which a 
common language, shared tastes, sheared conceptions of law and order, a 
shared system of weights and measures, allowed commerce to take place 
more easily than across linguistic and other boundaries. Based upon the 
market, a polity that could control the market arose. Gradually, a 
consciousness of the market emerged in the form of cultural and other 
nationalisms, so that the socio-economic unit of the market was reified into 
the nation-state, which then was granted a new past through the study of 
history (in fact, history itself, as an academic and educational subject, 
developed in this context).  
After World War II, new states, including Bhutan for all practical 
purposes, emerged into a different world than that of the 19th century. This 
gives Bhutan an opportunity to define itself for itself, a question that is 
raised by GNH's concern to use culture as a defense of the nation’s 
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independence. It is important to note that liberal economic theory 
legitimated the nation-state as a natural entity that existed along side the 
reified individual. We are well aware that in the last decade or so, 
particularly since, say 1989, the legitimacy of the nation-state has been 
called into question on at least two counts. First, it has been called into 
question by the assumption of the new supremacy of the market, 
particularly the global market, which trumps the interest of the state to 
protect itself. Second, it has been called into question by the movement for 
human rights, here under the guise of multiculturalism. The State is now 
being returned to itself, defined once again as a threat, and it is being 
dismantled at the same time. How is Bhutan to think about this in terms of 
its own interests? The New World Order is no longer the order of nation-
states whose interactions are governed by international law. It is a world of 
disorder controlled, if it is controlled at all, by the forces of the market. 
GNH and Development 
A vital shift has taken place in the focus and theory of development 
since 1989 and the fall of Communism. Incidentally, we should note that the 
public discussion of GNH in the West, or at least in English, probably began 
about the same time, in 1987 or 1988. Consciously intended or not, this is a 
symbolic event.  
Since the 16th century, European thinkers have been concerned with 
the problem of the increase of the wealth of their respective political entities, 
the wealth of the state (and empire) and, later, the wealth of the nation-state. 
In the great age of discovery, exploration, and conquest, the age of 
mercantilism, all debates in the social and economic realm centered on how 
to create more wealth for the state, how to increase the income of the state, 
to increase income over export. This led to regimes of controls of all kinds in 
order to prevent consumption and the uses of wealth that would diminish 
it. The importation of gold and other precious metals was encouraged; trade 
advantage was a prerequisite for power. 
The extraction of gold and other precious objects from the Americas 
after their conquest, accompanied as it was by the almost merciless 
exploitation of the “native” peoples, was a perfect example of mercantilist 
economic theory. The British Empire's trade policies, restricting trade, to the 
extent possible, between, for example, South Asia and Britain and excluding 
other trade relationships, i.e., the old "imperial preference" system, was 
another example of mercantilism.  
By the time Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, a 
shift had taken place away from the theory and practice of mercantilism to 
the belief that only by maximizing the individual merchant’s ability to trade 
and accumulate wealth could a nation's wealth increase. This new approach 
to economic activity was the obvious concomitant of the emergence of a 






state, and individual economic activity in a free market had replaced state 
controls and monopolies in the pursuit of wealth.  
A least two characteristics of this kind of thinking are significant for 
GNH. First, development per se was not a part of either system of thought. 
It was the accumulation of wealth that was significant, not development. 
There was no necessary relationship between the two. Moreover, and this is 
the second point, power was the significant variable in the equation. Under 
mercantilism, the power of the state to conquer was crucial to the 
accumulation of wealth at the least possible expense. Since the state, with its 
power to monopolize, was the primary economic and political actor, power 
was the most significant economic factor, and this meant military and naval 
power primarily. After mercantilism, under capitalism, with its emphasis on 
the individual entrepreneur, the state's power was no less important but 
was now directed differently. Now its purpose was to create those 
conditions that allowed the individual entrepreneur or corporation to 
maximize its advantages. This meant that the cost of maintaining a trade 
regime and the law and order that were beneficial for the private 
entrepreneur or for a corporation was the business of the state. The cost of 
doing this was often borne by the colonized peoples or, in some cases, by 
the people of the metropolitan power through taxes. A perfect example of 
the shift from mercantilism to capitalism is the abolition of the East India 
Company’s monopoly of the Indian market to the post mutiny colonial 
regime in India.  
However, the state did not disappear from commerce. In order to trade, 
which means to have goods and services for export, states and nation-states 
sought to maximize advantages for their own merchants and producers. 
This meant the development of tariff systems that created advantages for 
one's own people in the development and production of goods.  
Finally, by the time of World War I, it had become apparent that a 
combination of technology and trade had resulted in the emergence of a 
class of nations that were " developed" and the rest undeveloped. At least 
this was the expression we used until the 1990's. The technological basis of 
development was, first, a consequence of the need for military and 
transportation technology, in the periods of mercantilism, to enable certain 
states to conquer distant lands and to exploit them. This technology, for 
example military technology, geographical technology (maps) and sailing 
technology were crucial for the development of empires. Second, under 
capitalism technology became the basis for comparative advantage in 
production and commerce. It was widely recognized that technology was 
the basis for a new kind of productive power that would advantage those 
who possessed it over those who did not. In fact, a whole system of patents 
and trademarks, etc., developed to prevent the transfer of technology to 
those who might also be advantaged by it.  
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Development as such was not an issue until the Russian Revolution of 
1917. That was the ideological turning point in the entire thinking about 
World economics and the world system. Two historical moments in 
Western history symbolize this shift. On April 2, 1917, Woodrow Wilson, 
the American president, gave a speech declaring war on Germany. He said, 
"The world must be safe for democracy. " To all intents and purposes, this 
meant that the world must be opened to the kind of trade that the 
developing nations of the West found it advantageous to pursue. 
Democracy meant free trade, the abdication of the power of the state to 
control trade for its own benefit and the transfer of that power to the 
bourgeois class. The second date was November 7, 1917, the symbolic 
beginning of the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution was based 
upon the idea that it is not the bourgeoisie, not the capitalists, but the 
workers who actually produce wealth and should control it, and that, as the 
agent of the workers, the state had the primary responsibility for managing 
the economy in order to increase the standard of living of the working class, 
which meant increasing the wealth available for improvement. These two 
events symbolize the emergence of two totally different systems that were 
now in competition with each other. Competition between nation-states and 
empires now became competition between different ideologies and 
socioeconomic systems. The one used universalism, that is the argument 
that capitalism was natural, to argue for the political conditions that 
permitted the kind of trade that would advantage its own middle class of 
individual entrepreneurs. The other used the particularism of the interests 
of a particular class, the working class, to argue for a totally different trade 
regime. For the first, making the world safe for democracy, the slogan of 
"self-determination of nations", meant creating a trade and economic regime 
advantageous to the already developed nations. For the second, advancing 
the interests of Communism meant exploiting everything in sight in the 
interests of a particular class, and this meant reducing all trade to state 
controlled trade and production.  
It is in the context of this contradiction between the two systems that 
the concept of development came to the fore, particularly after World War 
II. In fact, the concept of development was advantageous from many 
perspectives. First, in the contest between the two systems, each holding out 
different possibilities, development was advantageous to each in the 
competition with the other. For the Western nations, the capitalists, 
development was advantageous because it was a way of denying or 
negating the political attractions of Communism. However, that kind of 
development was not intended to be disadvantageous to the developed 
countries, so that, for example, the issue of knowledge transfer, of what is 
now called intellectual property, the question of development policy that 
would be politically advantageous but not economically disadvantageous, 






became a serious issue in the developing countries. Furthermore, the 
development policies of the West were intended to encourage the increase 
in strength of those classes and political groups in the developing countries 
whose interests would ally them with the capitalist countries. A perfect 
example of this is the Vietnam War. This was a war fought not over 
capitalism vs. Communism in a narrow sense but over the issue of who 
would be advantaged by development. The regimes in post-colonial Africa, 
corrupt and unstable but always serving the interests of the developed 
countries, provide another example. For its part, the Communists 
encouraged development to win political battles in the competition with the 
West and to build military power, which it saw as a primary necessity in the 
competition with the West.  
The non-Western and non-Communist nations, a kind of third-party in 
the struggle between Communism and capitalism, understood that in this 
contest the only hope they had was to engage in "nation building", to 
increase and modernize infrastructure in order to withstand the pressure 
and control of the two major camps. The whole theory of nonalignment was 
based on this, with development theory and political nonalignment between 
the two powerful economical political camps as the foundation of this 
approach. (We should note that although the rest of the world thought 
China and Russia were allied, in fact we now know that they were not; they 
were fearful competitors.) “Development theory” developed in the context 
of this world struggle, and it is important to note that no development 
theory proved to be really valid or successful.  
In the perspective of both Capitalism and Communism, as well as in 
the perspective of the Non-Aligned powers, justice and happiness were 
understood to be a consequence of development but not to be the 
compelling reason for development. Development itself, not happiness or 
justice, was the goal. Capitalism argued that the individual would be happy 
if he or she accumulated more goods and wealth. In order for the trade 
system to work, consumerism had to be encouraged both in the developed 
and in the underdeveloped worlds. Consumerism was the way in which the 
capitalist system insured social stability so that production would not be 
interrupted. Communism argued that future generations would enjoy the 
advantages created by the present, so that the harsh regime of the present 
would pay off in future happiness. Both systems accepted the idea that 
injustice might be a necessary concomitant of their Weltanschauung, of their 
worldview.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolizing the end of Communism, 
meant the end of the competition between the two world systems that 
contradicted each other. The field, the entire world, was now left to one of 
the world's systems, capitalism, and this radically changed the 
Weltanschauung of development. The Development State, to which we will 
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turn shortly, the instrument for development in the period before 1989, is 
now being replaced by a new theory and a new phenomenon.  
The new world system, the new economic regime, is globalization. In 
this new system or regime, development is no longer a primary economic or 
political objective. There is no need for it, in fact. Today, integration of all 
economies into one is claimed to be to the advantage of all. Because there is 
no competition, the global system of capitalism can now function without 
the need for development as it was understood in the 20th-century. Not the 
interests of the nation, not the interests of the people, but the interest of the 
market itself, reified, has become the focus of attention. Moreover, another 
consideration, which began to appear prominently toward the final quarter 
of the 20th century, was the rise of the multinational corporation to a 
commanding position as the primary player in the international economy, 
replacing national corporations and individuals. Once again, now without 
development because development lacks any political purpose, the new 
global system sees happiness and justice as byproducts if they are important 
at all. Furthermore, in order to remove them as primary concerns or 
objectives, they have been reduced to individual concerns, so that the 
question of social justice or happiness in a society has been reduced to the 
question of the distribution of Justice as a commodity, which is the Liberal 
position today (see, for example, the American legal theorist Rawls), and 
happiness has become a matter of individual disposition with all kinds of 
measurements and therapies to improve individual happiness. We can even 
take drugs to be happier, so that happiness itself becomes a commodity on 
the market available to those who can afford it.  
Two more issues must command Bhutan’s particular attention. First, in 
all of this, small states have always been disadvantaged. Differences of scale 
are vital and are in fact differences of kind. None of the ideologies of 
development in the past have taken into account the fact that small states, 
small societies, are different. They lack the political power to withstand 
encroachment. For the most part, they lack resources to develop their own 
advantages. They lack the human resources to develop their own approach 
to their own concerns. Capitalism and, later, globalism have argued that 
small states should simply join the system. The rules of the market economy 
are universal, it is claimed, and apply to small states and societies just as 
they do to large ones. The asymmetry of power is not considered a 
significant factor. For Communism, the same criticism was valid. 
Communism argued that the analysis it made was valid for all societies, a 
kind of universal law of history. Gravity operated the same in Bhutan as it 
did in America or Russia.  
Second, to the extent that small states accepted and made policy on the 
basis of the assumptions sold to them by the universalistic claims of the 
contending ideologies, they themselves were weakened in their attempt to 






that they must surrender sovereignty to the global system, which itself is a 
playing field of asymmetrical power. Therefore, to the extent that small 
states buy into both the theoretical and the ideological claims of the 
specialists from outside, they weaken themselves.  
This is the context within which GNH becomes significant. The reason 
why it has attracted attention is precisely because of the challenge it poses to 
the theories, ideologies, values, and politics of the powerful. It is, in fact, an 
experiment. 
GNH and Culture 
Both Capitalism and Communism legitimated the acquisition of greater 
wealth, though for different purposes and with different rationalizations. 
For both camps, however, the objective proved hard to achieve, and when a 
statistical improvement in the economy of a particular country appeared, 
new wealth was often so maldistributed within that country that social and 
political unrest increased rapidly. With time, the optimism of the period 
immediately after the end of World War II began to confront the 
incontrovertible fact that there was a growing gap between the developed 
and the underdeveloped countries, between the “North” and the “South”. 
The terminology may have changed but the fact did not. “Development” 
became the term applied to the process of overcoming the gap. 
For many reasons, pessimism with regard to the possibility of 
overcoming the gap increased with time, particularly in the 1970s. A factor 
had to be found both to explain the gap and to suggest the reasons why it 
existed. Both in Capitalism and Communism, “culture” entered the 
discourse to explain this gap. “Culture,” often equated with “tradition,” 
“traditional culture,” was deemed the culprit in the increasingly unequal 
development. Curiously, the Communists had identified the culprit from 
the very beginning and had pursued active, often violently aggressive 
policies to eradicate old cultures and introduce new ones. The Chinese 
“Cultural Revolution” was just such an aggressive attack on tradition and 
an attempt to wrench China from the clutches of the old culture and force it 
into a new one more conducive to development. 
In Western thought, the concept that industrialization was a culture in 
itself, that the introduction of modern means of communication also 
required the introduction of the culture of modernization, became current. 
This ran all the way from insisting that modernization required the 
replacement of the “traditional” extended family with the nuclear family to 
abandonment of all kinds of “traditional practices” that hindered the 
emergence of the Western-type of individual entrepreneur. In short, the 
“underdeveloped” peoples of the world had to undergo social, cultural and 
psychological modernization if economic progress was to be made. 
“Science” had to replace “traditional values” and scientific disinterest had to 
replace the parochial interests of any part of a culture or the culture itself. It 
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was, by the way, here that the idea of “technical assistance” and 
“development specialists” came to the fore, i.e., help and individuals that 
were scientific and disinterested in the question of value conflict. 
This is not a trivial question by any means. Bhutan must be well aware 
of the fact that in its own region, the agents of development have introduced 
changes that are destructive of whole cultures. In fact, the issue has become 
sufficiently pressing that international organizations now speak of “cultural 
genocide,” by which they mean the cultural cost of introducing 
socioeconomic change that does not factor into its processes the question of 
the development of culture as well. His Majesty’s insistence that culture 
must be an instrument for the protection of the nation reflects this reality 
and calls for a creative response within GNH thinking. 
Buddhism and GNH 
In light of this discussion so far, an important question that has to be 
considered is the relationship between Buddhism and GNH. Two factors 
seem paramount. First, Buddhism may be considered, for the purpose of 
this discussion, as a set of values that are quite different from those of the 
culture, Christian, in which development theory and modern political 
theory developed. For example, in the Christian Weltanschauung, the 
individual is considered to be a totally unique being, possessed of a unique 
soul, and to be the primary actor in all regards in the drama of his or her 
own salvation. This quite obviously impacts seriously on development 
theory and on the role of the individual. The great Western sociological 
thinker, Max Weber, emphasized the relationship between Christianity and 
the rise of Capitalism. Buddhism, for its part, refuses to reify the individual 
or any other entity. Consequently, the Weltanschauung of a culture that is 
Buddhist will be very different from that of one that is not. This, of course, is 
true for all cultures. However, it must be taken into particular account in 
Bhutan, where Buddhism and Bhutanese culture are almost isomorphic. To 
the extent that Bhutan is a Buddhist and not a Christian or Muslim society, 
its Weltanschauung, its social, cultural and political ethos, rooted in 
Buddhism, must be the foundation of its public policies. Change, in other 
words, must be based on Buddhism, not on other constructions of the 
world. This is the particularity and importance of GNH for Bhutan. To the 
extent that GNH has validity beyond Bhutan, it is because it raises vital 
questions that have heretofore not been central to political and social 
discourse. 
Second, although we divide life into various domains, such as the 
personal, the social, the political, the religious, the psychological, etc., in fact 
life is not lived that way. It is a commonplace to recognize that my 
psychological condition will have an impact on my social life and that my 
economic situation will have an impact on my psychological life. In fact, life 






seamless whole. If in one part of our lives we engage in activities that are 
radically different in their quality and in their ethos compared to our 
activities in other parts of our lives, the whole fabric will change. 
Consequently, if we value Buddhism and if we value Bhutanese culture, the 
strategies and tactics we use for economic development must be intricately 
and intimately part of Buddhist and Bhutanese culture and its 
Weltanschauung. 
This is a crucial challenge. Let us assume that a major directive, the 
prime directive, of Buddhism is to not harm others. Let us also assume that 
a prime directive of Buddhism is to create those conditions that allow all 
sentient beings to move along the path to enlightenment. If that is the case, 
then GNH must take as its own prime directive the development of those 
strategies and tactics that, first, do not harm sentient beings in the process of 
change, and, second, are immediately aimed at decreasing the obstacles, the 
"Negativities," that impede the search for enlightenment. If one takes this 
seriously, and if one assumes the seamlessness of life as a whole (itself a 
Buddhist concept), and if one understands that Buddhism as a value system 
differs from other value systems, as all value systems differ from each other, 
then GNH must approach development from a different perspective. Note 
that this is not a question of individual happiness or of happiness in any 
immediate sense. The "Happiness" that we are considering as the objective 
of GNH means the removal of obstacles, the condition in which any 
negativity is diminished, not the immediate satisfaction of the individual as 
such. 
The “happiness” of Gross National Happiness, in other words, is not to 
be understood in metaphysical terms. It is a very immediate and practical 
concept. It is possible to identify those developments and those already 
existing conditions that impede the realization of the values a society and 
culture, Bhutanese society and culture, hold high, hold to be important. The 
challenge of GNH is to design practical policies that achieve this objective. 
This must involve the redirection of resources to this purpose and, equally 
important, the development of education that self-consciously has the same 
purpose. It is indeed true that, for example, consumerism grows partly 
because of the introduction of TV and other forms of information 
technology. TV and IT cannot be removed once they are introduced, and 
any attempt to do so would probably be counterproductive in terms of the 
values of GNH. However, their presence must be accounted for in the 
development both of regulations controlling consumption and the 
development of an educational system that will strengthen or redirect the 
attention of the next generation away from consumerism and toward the 
values GNH is promoting. 
GNH must be institutionalized in an organization that will provide 
leadership, research, planning, and evaluation of the operationalization of 
GNH. 
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The educational system must take responsibility for the creation of 
GNH values in succeeding generations. 
Mechanisms must be developed for the inclusion of people from all 
walks of life in the discussion of GNH. This is important for both GNH and 
for good governance. 
The GNH state must develop those areas of expertise that serve the 
purposes of GNH, including the social sciences and humanities, just as 
Bhutan has developed a cadre of experts in engineering, education, 
medicine and commerce. 
We are fully aware that objections will be raised concerning the costs of 
these recommendations, and it cannot be denied that this will be an issue. 
Nevertheless, we believe that a modest beginning on the project of GNH 
will attract both worldwide attention and investment.  
The proposed GNH Directorate, or its equivalent, must have the 
responsibility for designing and taking the initial steps. This suggests that 
the very first step must be the creation of an institutional framework. 
Redirecting or channeling the energies and activities of existing agencies in 
such a way that they reflect and exhibit the values of GNH can accomplish a 
considerable amount. They will become, then, examples for others to follow. 
This is particularly the case in the field of education. Finally, careful and 
reflective planning can take place with a relatively small investment in 
order to lay the groundwork for the operationalization of GNH. 
The very idea of GNH was designed and promulgated by His Majesty 
the King, upon whose continuing strong and enlightened leadership the 
future of Bhutanese society depends.  
 
